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Abstract
We describe the large deviations properties, stationary distribution asymptotics,
and stochastically stable states of stochastic evolutionary processes based on the logit
choice rule, focusing on behavior in the small noise double limit. These aspects of the
stochastic evolutionary process can be characterized in terms of solutions to certain
minimum cost path problems. We solve these problems explicitly using tools from
optimal control theory. The analysis focuses on three-strategy coordination games
that satisfy the marginal bandwagon property and that have an interior equilibrium,
but our approach can be applied to other classes of games and other choice rules.
1. Introduction
A basic concern of evolutionary game theory is to understand the behavior of popula-
tions of strategically interacting agents over long time spans. Doing so means describing
how populations escape from and transit between equilibria, and using these descrip-
tions to determine the stochastically stable states, which are played in a large proportion
of periods over long enough time spans when suboptimal choices are rare.1
Most work on these questions has focused on the best response with mutations (BRM)
model of Kandori et al. (1993), in which the probability that an agent plays a suboptimal
∗We thank Daniel Liberzon for helpful discussions. Financial support from NSF Grants SES-0851580
and SES-1155135 and the Vienna Science and Technology Fund (WWTF) under project fund MA 09-017 is
gratefully acknowledged.
†Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, WI 53706, USA.
e-mail: whs@ssc.wisc.edu; website: www.ssc.wisc.edu/˜whs.‡Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, Germany. e-mail: mathias.staudigl@
uni-bielefeld.de; website: mwpweb.eu/MathiasStaudigl.
1See Foster and Young (1990), Kandori et al. (1993), and Young (1993).
strategy is independent of its payoff consequences. But in modeling the breakdown of
equilibrium, it is sometimes more natural to allow mistake probabilities to depend on
their payoff consequences. Under such specifications, the unlikeliness of a path away
from equilibrium depends not only on its length, but also on the particular sequence of
suboptimal choices the path entails. Because of this complication, little is known about
the long term behavior beyond cases with two strategies per player, and the particularly
tractable case of potential games under the logit choice rule.2
In Sandholm and Staudigl (2014) (henceforth SS), we introduced tools for studying
large deviations and stochastic stability in stochastic evolutionary models, evaluating
these properties in the small noise double limit. The first limit, which takes the noise
level in agent’s choice rules to zero, can be analyzed using well-known tools from large
deviations theory,3 but yields results expressed in terms of solutions to optimal control
problems on a discrete state space. These problems are not tractable unless the number of
agents is small. In SS, we show that by taking a second limit in the population size, one can
approximate the solutions to these discrete control problems by solutions to continuous
control problems. Provided that the latter problems can be solved, this approach makes
it possible to explicitly describe long term behavior beyond the cases studied to date.
However, since the relevant control problems are multidimensional and nonsmooth, it is
not obvious that analytical solutions can be obtained.
The aim of the present paper is to show that at least in certain interesting cases, the
analysis of large deviations and stochastic stability in the small noise double limit is indeed
tractable. Our analysis here focuses on evolution under the logit choice rule (Blume (1993,
1997)), under which the rate of decay of the probability with which a strategy is chosen is
determined by the difference between its payoff and that of an optimal strategy. Singling
out one interesting class of games, we consider three-strategy coordination games that
satisfy the marginal bandwagon property (Kandori and Rob (1998)) and that have an
interior equilibrium. This class of games, which we call simple three-strategy coordination
games, is large enough to allow a some variety in its analysis, but small enough that the
analysis remains manageable. We explain at the close of the paper why similar analyses
should be feasible for other classes of games and choice rules.
We analyze the control problems associated with two distinct kinds of large deviations
properties. We first consider the exit problem, which is used to assess the expected time
until the evolutionary process leaves the basin of attraction of a stable equilibrium, and
to determine the likely exit path. Solving this problem for the class of games under
2For the former, see Blume (2003), Sandholm (2007, 2010b), and Staudigl (2012); for the latter, see Blume
(1993, 1997), Alo´s-Ferrer and Netzer (2010), and Sandholm (2010c, Sec. 11.5).
3See Freidlin and Wentzell (1998), Catoni (1999), and Young (1993, 1998).
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consideration, we show that the likely exit path proceeds along the boundary of the
simplex, escaping the basin of attraction through a boundary mixed equilibrium.
To evaluate stationary distribution asymptotics and stochastic stability, one must in-
stead consider the transition problem, which is used to assess the probable time until a
transition between a given pair of stable equilibria, and the most likely path that this
transition will follow. We solve the transition problem explicitly for simple three-strategy
coordination games, and find that the nature of the problem’s solution depends in a basic
way on whether the game in question is also a potential game. When this is so, the
optimal control problem is degenerate, in that there are open sets of states from which
there are a continuum of minimal cost paths. Still, the optimal paths between equilibria
always proceed directly along the relevant edge of the simplex. The control problem is
not degenerate for games without a potential function, which we call skewed games. But
unlike in the case of potential games, optimal paths between equilibria of skewed games
need not be direct; instead, they may proceed along an alternate edge of the simplex, turn
into the interior, and pass through the interior equilibrium.
By combining solutions to the control problems with results from SS, we are able to
characterize the long run behavior of the stochastic evolutionary process in the small
noise double limit. We use a parameterized class of examples to illustrate the effects of
payoff-dependent mistake probabilities on equilibrium selection, and to contrast long-run
behavior in the logit and BRM models. In addition, in the class of potential games we
consider, we fully describe the asymptotic behavior of the stationary distribution in the
small noise double limit, showing that the rate of decay of the stationary distribution mass
at each state equals the difference between the value of the potential function at that state
and the maximum value of potential. In contrast to those in previous work on logit choice
in potential games,4 the assumptions we impose on the transition law of the evolutionary
process are asymptotic nature, and so do not allow us to express the stationary distribution
in closed form. We instead build our analysis on large deviations estimates, and thereby
obtain a clearer intuition about the form that the stationary distribution asymptotics take.
The heart of the paper is the analysis of the exit and transition problems. These optimal
control problems have nonsmooth running costs, but are rather simple in other respects.
If L(x,u) represents the cost of choosing direction of motion u at state x, then L is piecewise
linear in u regardless of the agents’ choice rule. When agents employ the logit choice rule,
L is also piecewise linear in x.
Taking advantage of these properties, we use sufficient conditions for optimality due to
Boltyanskii (1966) and Piccoli and Sussmann (2000) to construct candidate value functions,
4See Blume (1993, 1997) and Sandholm (2010c, Sec. 11.5 and 12.2), as well as Section 7 below.
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and to verify that they are indeed the value functions for our problems. These sufficient
conditions require the value function to be continuous, to be continuously differentiable
except on a finite union of manifolds of positive codimension, and to satisfy the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation wherever the value function is smooth. In our case, for each fixed
state x, the piecewise linearity of L(x,u) in u means that only a small number of controls
need to be considered, while the piecewise linearity of L(x,u) in x makes it enough to
check the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation at a small number of well-chosen states.
These properties of the optimal control problem are not dependent on the class of
games we consider, but only on the linearity of payoffs in the population state. Moreover,
much of the structure of the problem is retained under alternatives to the logit choice
rule. Thus as we explain in the final section of the paper, it should be possible to use
the approach developed here to study long run behavior in broader classes of games and
under other choice rules.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model of stochastic evolution,
defines the class of games we study, and introduces the optimal control problems. Section
3 states the verification theorem and provides some initial steps of the analysis. Section
4 begins the construction of the value functions for the exit and transition problems. Sec-
tion 5 completes the construction for the exit problem. Section 6 does so for the transition
problem, separately considering the cases of potential games and skewed games. Sec-
tion 7 combines this analysis with results from SS to characterize stationary distribution
asymptotics and stochastic stability in the small noise double limit. Section 8 discusses
extensions of the analysis to other classes of games and choice rules.
2. Definitions
We briefly review the model of stochastic evolution from Sandholm and Staudigl
(2014), and introduce new definitions needed here.
2.1 The stochastic evolutionary model
A population of size N choose strategies from finite strategy set S. The population’s
aggregate behavior is described by a population state x, an element of the gridX N = X∩ 1NZn
in the simplex X = {x ∈ Rn+ :
∑n
i=1 xi = 1}. The standard basis vector ei ∈ X ⊂ Rn
represents the pure state at which all agents play strategy i, and s(x) = {i ∈ S : xi > 0}
denotes the support of state x. We identify a finite-population game with its payoff function
FN : X N → Rn, where FNi (x) ∈ R is the payoff to strategy i when the population state is
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x ∈ X N.
The stochastic evolutionary process XN,η = {XN,ηk }∞k=0 is a Markov chain with state space
X N. It is parameterized by the population size N and the noise level η > 0. The index k
denotes the number of revision opportunities that have occurred to date, and corresponds
to kN units of clock time. The transition probabilities for the process are given by
PN,ηx,y ≡ P
(
XN,ηk+1 = y
∣∣∣ XN,ηk = x) = xi σηj (FNi→·(x)) if y = x + 1N (e j − ei), j , i,
with the remaining probability assigned to PN,ηx,x . Thus for an agent to switch from strategy
i to strategy j during the next period, the agent randomly chosen to revise must be an i
player, which occurs with probability xi, and this agent must opt to switch to strategy j.
The probability of the latter is obtained by applying the function σηj , the jth component of
the noisy best response protocol ση : Rn → int(X), to FNi→·(x) ∈ Rn, the clever payoff vector for
strategy i players at population state x.
In this paper, we take ση to be the logit choice protocol, defined by
(1) σηj (pi) =
exp(η−1pi j)∑
k∈S exp(η−1pik)
.
The clever payoff vector FNi→·(x) ∈ Rn, defined by
FNi→ j(x) = F
N
j (x +
1
N (e j − ei)),
accounts for the slightly different incentives faced by players of different strategies in a
finite-population game. We define the pure best response correspondence for strategy i ∈ S in
game FN by
bNi (x) = argmax
j∈S
FNi→ j(x).
State x ∈ X N is a Nash equilibrium of FN if i ∈ bNi (x) whenever xi > 0, so that no agent can
obtain a higher payoff by switching strategies.
2.2 Linear population games
As N grows large, we assume that the finite-population games FN converge uniformly
to a limit game F : X → Rn, which we interpret as a continuous-population game. In this
paper this limit game is linear: F(x) = Ax for some A ∈ Rn×n. Games FN and F thus describe
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the matching of agents to play a symmetric normal form game with payoff matrix A.
The following notation, while not entirely standard, will be very convenient. We use
superscripts to refer to rows of A and subscripts to refer to columns. Thus Ai is the ith row
of A, A j is the jth column of A, and Aij is the (i, j)th entry. These objects can be obtained
by pre- and post-multiplying A by standard basis vectors:
Ai = e′iA, A j = Ae j, A
i
j = e
′
iAe j.
In a similar fashion, we use super- and subscripts of the form i − j to denote certain
differences obtained from A.
Ai− j = Ai − A j = (ei − e j)′A, Ai− jk−` = Aik − Ai` − A jk + A j` = (ei − e j)′A(ek − e`).
Using this notation, we define the best response region for strategy i by
B i = {x ∈ X : Ai− jx ≥ 0 for all j ∈ S}.
Similarly, B i j = B i ∩ B j describes the boundary between the best response regions for
strategies i and j.
We call A a coordination game if
(2) Aii > A
j
i for all i, j ∈ S with j , i,
so that each pure state is a Nash equilibrium of F. This implies that
(3) Ai− ji− j > 0 for all i, j ∈ S.
We call Ai− ji− j = A
j−i
j−i the (i, j)th alignment of A. This quantity, which corresponds to the
denominator of the mixed equilibrium in the binary-choice game with strategies i and j,
represents the strength of incentives to coordinate (or, if negative, to miscoordinate) in the
restricted game with strategy set {i, j}.
The game A has the marginal bandwagon property (MBP) (Kandori and Rob (1998)) if
(4) Ai− ji−k > 0 for all i, j, k ∈ S with i < { j, k}.
This property requires that when opponents switch to strategy i from some other strategy,
the payoffs to playing strategy i improve relative to those of all other strategies.
The next definition for games with three or more strategies plays a basic role in our
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analysis. For an ordered triple of distinct strategies (i, j, k), we define the (i, j, k)th skew of
A by
Qi jk = Aij−k + A
j
k−i + A
k
i− j(5)
= Ai− ji−k − Ai−ki− j = A j−kj−i − A j−ij−k = Ak−ik− j − Ak− jk−i .
Evidently skew is alternating, in the sense that it is preserved by even permutations of the
index list and negated by odd ones:
(6) Qi jk = Q jki = Qki j = −Qkji = −Q jik = −Qik j.
We call A a potential game if A = C + 1r′ for some symmetric matrix C ∈ Rn×n and
some vector r ∈ Rn, where 1 ∈ Rn denotes the vector of ones. Thus A is the sum
of a common interest game C and a passive game 1r′ in which a player’s payoff depends
only on his opponent’s strategy. Clearly, games A and C induce the same best-response
correspondence and the same set of Nash equilibria.
Potential games admit a variety of characterizations. For instance, A is a potential game
if and only if ΦAΦ is a symmetric matrix, where Φ = I − 1n11′ ∈ Rn×n is the orthogonal
projection onto the tangent space TX = {z ∈ Rn : ∑i zi = 0}.5 The latter condition says that
A is a symmetric bilinear form on TX × TX, meaning that z′Azˆ = zˆ′Az for all z, zˆ ∈ TX.
Alternatively, A is a potential game if and only if it satisfies the triangular integrability
condition of Hofbauer (1985), which can be stated in terms of skews: Qi jk = 0 for all
distinct i, j, k ∈ S.6
2.3 Discrete and complete best response dynamics
Returning to the evolutionary model, we capture the typical behavior of the process
XN,η at low noise levels using the discrete best response dynamic, defined by the difference
inclusion
(7) xNk+1 − xNk ∈
{ 1
N
(ei − e j) : j ∈ s(x) and i ∈ bNj (x)
}
.
We call the set KN ⊆ X N strongly invariant under (7) if no solution to (7) starting in KN ever
leaves KN. A set that is minimal with respect to this property is called a recurrent class of
(7). We denote the collection of such recurrent classes by K N. If A is a coordination game
5The “only if” direction of this claim is obvious. Letting Ξ = 1n11
′ = I − Φ, the “if” direction follows
from the decomposition A = (ΦAΦ + (ΦAΞ + ΞA′Φ)) + Ξ (A − A′Φ). Compare Sandholm (2010a).
6See Sandholm (2009, Proposition 4.5).
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with the marginal bandwagon property, then K N = K = {{e1}, . . . , {en}}, so that recurrent
classes correspond to strict equilibria.7
The limiting version of (7) is the complete best response dynamic. This dynamic is defined
as the differential inclusion
x˙ ∈ conv({ei − e j : j ∈ s(x), i ∈ b(x)}),(8)
where b(x) = argmaxi∈S Fi(x) is the pure best response correspondence of the limit game F. An
absolutely continuous path φ : [0,T] → X path is a solution of (8) if the inclusion in (8)
holds at almost all t ∈ [0,T].
For a coordination game A, the weak basin of attraction W (ei) of pure equilibrium ei
under the complete best response dynamic consists of those states from which there is a
solution of (8) that terminates at ei. W (ei) contains the best response region B i: since B i
is convex and contains ei, there is a solution of (8) from each state in B i that proceeds in a
straight line to ei. The strong basin of attraction S (ei) of ei is the set of states from which no
solution of (8) terminates at a pure equilibrium besides ei. It follows immediately that
(9) S (ei) = X r
⋃
j,i
W (e j).
2.4 Path costs
Our aim in this paper is to understand how the process XN,η escapes from and transits
between recurrent states, and to use this information to describe stationary distributions
and to evaluate stochastic stability. To obtain analytical results, we consider the process as
the parameters N and η are taken to their limiting values. For the small noise limit, well-
known results from large deviations theory (Freidlin and Wentzell (1998), Catoni (1999),
Young (1998)) allow one to describe long-term behavior in terms of certain minimum cost
paths through the discrete space X N. In SS, we show that as the population size N grows
large, these discrete control problems converge to continuous ones, defined in terms of
continuous paths through the simplex X.
To define the latter problems, we introduce the unlikelihood function Υ : Rn → Rn+
associated with the protocols {ση}η>0:
(10) Υ j(pi) = − lim
η→0 η log σ
η
j (pi).
The cost of absolutely continuous path φ : [0,T]→ X is its aggregate unlikelihood:
7See Kandori and Rob (1998) or SS Example 3.1.
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(11) c(φ) =
∫ T
0
[φ˙t]′+Υ(F(φt)) dt.
Under any noisy best response protocol, a path has zero cost if and only if it is a solution
of the complete best response dynamic (8).
The unlikelihood function for the logit choice protocol (1) is
(12) Υi(pi) = max
j∈S
pi j − pii.
Thus the cost function under this protocol for the linear game F(x) = Ax is
(13) c(φ) =
∫ T
0
[φ˙t]′+(1A
bˇ(φt) − A)φt dt,
where bˇ(·) is any selection from the game’s pure best response correspondence b(·).
2.5 The minimum cost path problems
Two kinds of minimum cost path problems are used to describe the long-term behav-
ior of the process XN,η. To introduce them, we let Φ(K,L) denote the set of absolutely
continuous paths through X from the closed set K ⊂ X to the closed set L ⊂ X.
The cost of exit from the strong basin of attraction (9) of strict equilibrium ei is defined
by the following problem:
(14) C({ei},∪ j,iW (e j)) = min{c(φ) : φ ∈ Φ({ei},∪ j,iW (e j))}.
The cost of exit describes the asymptotic behavior of the expected time before the process
escapes the strong basin of attraction of ei. Suppose we run the process XN,η from state ei,
and let τN,η = min{k : XN,ηk = e j for some j , i} be the time at which the process first reaches
some other strict equilibrium. Then SS Corollary 6.1 implies that
lim
N→∞ limη→0
η
N
logE[τN,η|XN,η0 = ei] = C({ei},∪ j,iW (e j)).
In addition, the cost minimizing path in (14) indicates the point on the strong basin’s
boundary by which the escape route is likely to pass.
To account for the global behavior of the process XN,η—specifically, to determine the
expected time until a specific equilibrium ek is reached, and to evaluate stationary distri-
butions and stochastic stability—we must consider the cost of a transition from one strict
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equilibrium ei to the weak basin of attraction of another:
(15) C({ei},W (ek)) = inf{c(φ) : φ ∈ Φ({ei},W (ek))}.
Characterizations of the global behavior ofXN,η use the transition costs (15) in combination
with graph theoretic arguments; see Section 7 below.
We noted above that when A is a coordination game, Bk ⊆ W (ek). It follows that the
minimum cost path problems (14) and (15) do not change if we replace W (ek) with Bk,
since one can travel fromW (ek) to Bk at zero cost. It will be convenient to do so from this
point forward. Actually, it will be clear from the analysis below that in the class of games
we consider, W (ek) and Bk are identical.
3. Preliminary Analysis
To understand the long-term behavior of the processes XN,η in the small noise double
limit, we must solve the exit cost problems (14) and the transition cost problems (15).
These problems have nonsmooth running costs, and are multidimensional in games with
more than two strategies. The main task of the present paper is to show that the problems
can nevertheless be solved explicitly. We focus on a class of three-strategy coordination
games and on the logit choice protocol, but we explain in Section 8 why solutions can also
be obtained in other settings.
3.1 A verification theorem
We now introduce the result from optimal control theory that we use to solve the cost
minimization problems above.
Let A be an m-dimensional affine subspace of Rn with tangent space TA , and let the
set Ω ⊂ A be closed relative to A and have piecewise smooth boundary. Let the function
L : A × TA → R+ be Lipschitz continuous, and let Z ⊂ TA be compact and convex. The
control problem and its value function V∗ : A → R+ are defined as follows:
V∗(x) = min
∫ T
0
L(φt, νt) dt(16)
over T ∈ [0,∞), ν : [0,T]→ Z measurable
subject to φ : [0,T]→ A absolutely continuous,
φ0 = x, φT ∈ Ω,
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φ˙t = νt for almost every t ∈ [0,T].
Theorem 3.1 provides sufficient conditions for a function V : A → R+ to be the value
function of (16). The key requirement is that the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
(17) min
u∈Z
(
L(x,u) + DV(x)u
)
= 0
hold at almost every x ∈ A .
Theorem 3.1 (Verification theorem (Boltyanskii (1966), Piccoli and Sussmann (2000))).
Let V : A → R+ be a continuous function that is continuously differentiable except on the
union U ⊂ A of a finite number of manifolds, each of dimension less than m. Suppose that
(i) For every x ∈ A , there is a time T ∈ [0,∞) and a measurable function ν : [0,T]→ Z such
that the corresponding controlled trajectory φ : [0,T] → A with φ0 = x satisfies φT ∈ Ω
and
∫ T
0
L(φt, νt) dt = V(x);
(ii) The HJB equation (17) holds at all x ∈ A rU.
Then V = V∗.
Condition (i) of the theorem says that the values specified by the function V can
all be achieved, and so implies that V∗ ≤ V. Establishing the opposite inequality is
straightforward if V is C1. Suppose that this is the case, and that Tˆ ∈ [0,∞) and νˆ : [0, Tˆ]→
Z are feasible in problem (16), so that the controlled trajectory φˆ : [0, Tˆ]→ A with φˆ0 = x
satisfies φˆTˆ ∈ Ω. Then the HJB equation (17) implies that
L(φˆt, νˆt) ≥ −DV(φˆt)νˆt = − ddtV(φˆt) for almost all t ∈ (0, Tˆ).
Integrating yields∫ Tˆ
0
L(φt, νt) ≥ −
(
V(φˆTˆ) − V(φˆ0)
)
= V(x),
and so V∗ ≥ V.
To prove Theorem 3.1 as stated, one establishes that the cost of any feasible controlled
trajectory can be approximated arbitrarily well by the cost of a feasible controlled trajectory
that only intersects the manifolds in U at a finite set of times. The first result along these
lines is due to Boltyanskii (1966), with various improvements culminating in the work of
Piccoli and Sussmann (2000). Theorem 3.1 above follows from the statement and proof of
Theorem 6.3.1 in the textbook treatment of Scha¨ttler and Ledzewicz (2012).8
8In the statement of Theorem 6.3.1 of Scha¨ttler and Ledzewicz (2012), A is all ofRn, the function L is C1,
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ei
ek
x*
ej
w(ek)
Figure 1: The original and extended versions of the transition problem (15).
While our control problems are set in the simplex X, Theorem 3.1 addresses problems
whose state space is an affine subset ofRn. To use the theorem, we redefine our problems
by extending their state space to the affine hull aff(X) = {x ∈ Rn : ∑i xi = 1} of X. Since our
target sets are defined by linear inequalities, we can define the target sets of our extended
problem by imposing the same linear inequalities in aff(X) rather than in X (Figure 1). If
in this extended problem, the optimal paths from initial conditions in X to the extended
target set are themselves contained in X, then these paths are optimal in the original
problem; consequently, the restriction of the resulting value function to X is the value
function of the original problem. This is precisely what happens in the minimum cost
path problems for the games we focus on here. We discuss the general case in Section 8.
Also, notice that under path cost function (11), reparameterizing a path—changing
the speed at which the states in the path are traversed—does not affect its cost. Thus in
looking for minimum cost paths between sets in aff(X), it is without loss of generality to
consider paths satisfying φ˙t ∈ Z, where Z is the compact set conv({ei − e j : i, j ∈ S}).
3.2 A lemma for checking the HJB equation
We now introduce a basic tool for verifying the HJB equation in our setting. When x is
in B i ⊂ aff(X), the HJB equation (17) becomes
and the target set Ω is required to have smooth boundary. However, inspection of their proof reveals that
it goes through unchanged under the weaker requirements imposed in Theorem 3.1 above.
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(18) min
u∈Z
(
[u]′+(1A
i − A)x + DV(x)u
)
= 0.
Since the function being minimized in (18) is linear in u on each orthant of Rn, there
must be a minimizer either at an extreme point of Z or at the origin, where the function
evaluates to 0. Therefore, substituting eb − ea for u, we see that (18) is equivalent to
(19) min
ea,eb,ea
(
(ei − ea)′Ax + DV(x)(ea − eb)
)
≥ 0.
Lemma 3.2 provides a sufficient condition for the HJB equation (19) to be satisfied at a
state in the (relative) interior of B i when A is a three-strategy game.
Lemma 3.2. Let A be a three-strategy game with S = {i, j, k}. Suppose that the candidate value
function V is constructed from a feedback control that takes value ek−ei at all states in a neighborhood
of x ∈ int(B i). If
DV(x)(ei − eh) ≥ 0 for h ∈ { j, k}, and(20)
(DV(x) − (Ax)′) (e j − ek) ≥ 0,(21)
then V satisfies the HJB equation (19) at x.
The proof of Lemma 3.2 is presented in Appendix A.1. We argue there that the assumption
that the control is ek − ei in a neighborhood of x implies that the function to be minimized
in the HJB equation (19) equals 0 when ea = ek and eb = ei. This equality can be restated as
(22) (DV(x) − (Ax)′) (ek − ei) = 0.
The proof then uses conditions (20)–(22), and the fact that x ∈ B i to show that the function
to be minimized in (19) is nonnegative for the remaining five choices of ea − eb.
3.3 Costs of direct paths
As a final preliminary, we present two simple formulas for path costs in linear games
under the logit rule. For x, y ∈ aff(X), we let γ(x, y) denote the cost of the direct (straight-
line) path from x to y:
γ(x, y) = c(φ), where φ : [0, 1]→ X is defined by φt = (1 − t)x + ty.
The first formula concerns a class of direct paths whose costs are easily expressed in terms
of the paths’ endpoints: those in which the motion of the state involves agents switching
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away from the current best response.
Lemma 3.3. Suppose that x, y ∈ B i, and that y − x = d (α − ei) for some α ∈ X with αi = 0 and
some d ≥ 0. Then
γ(x, y) = (x − y)′A
(x + y
2
)
.
Proof. Since φ˙t = y−x = d (α−ei) ∈ TX and [φ˙t]′−(1Ai−A) = d e′i(1Ai−A) = d (Ai−Ai) = 0′,
γ(x, y) =
∫ 1
0
[φ˙t]′+(1A
i − A)φt dt =
∫ 1
0
φ˙′t(1A
i − A)φt dt = −
∫ 1
0
φ˙′tAφt dt
= −(y − x)′A
∫ 1
0
φt dt = (x − y)′A
(x + y
2
)
. 
In some important cases this formula can be simplified further. The second formula
describes the costs that are realized when the state moves from x ∈ B i in direction ek − ei
until reaching a state y in the set B i j = B i ∩ B j, where strategies i and j are both optimal.
Lemma 3.4. Let x ∈ B i, and suppose that
(23) y = x + d (ek − ei) ∈ B i j for some d > 0
and that Ai− ji−k , 0. Then
d =
Ai− jx
Ai− ji−k
and(24)
γ(x, y) = d Ai−ky +
1
2
d2Ai−ki−k.(25)
In particular, if j = k, then Ai−ky = 0, so (25) becomes
(26) γ(x, y) =
1
2
d2Ai−ki−k =
1
2
(Ai−kx)2
Ai−ki−k
.
Proof. Since y ∈ B i j, Ai− jy = 0, which with (23) implies (24). Also, combining (23) and
Lemma 3.3 yields (25), since
γ(x, y) = (x − y)′A
(x + y
2
)
= d (ei − ek)′A
(
y + 12d(ei − ek)
)
= d Ai−ky +
1
2
d2Ai−ki−k. 
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4. Construction of Value Functions: The Initial Step
4.1 Simple three-strategy coordination games
We now focus on three-strategy coordination games (2) that satisfy the marginal band-
wagon property (4) and that admit a completely mixed equilibrium, a class of games we
henceforth call simple three-strategy coordination games. The completely mixed equilibrium
x∗ ∈ int(X) is the unique state in aff(X) at which the payoffs to all strategies are equal:
Ax∗ = c1 for some c ∈ R. For distinct strategies i, j ∈ S, such games admit a unique mixed
equilibrium xi j with support {i, j}. This xi j is the unique state in B i j with xk = 0.
We now define two vectors that play basic roles in the analysis to come. For distinct
strategies i, j ∈ S, we define the vector ζi j = ζ ji ∈ TX by
(27) ζi j =
1
x∗k
(xi j − x∗)
When drawn with its tail at x∗, ζi j points outward along the boundary B i j between best
response regions B i and B j (Figure 2). Since the vector (A j−i)′ is normal to B i j, ζi j is a
multiple of the cross product
(A j−i)′ × 1 = A j−ij−kei + Ai− ji−ke j − A j−ij−iek.
Since (27) implies that ζi jk = −1, it follows that
(28) ζi j =
A j−ij−k
A j−ij−i
ei +
Ai− ji−k
A j−ij−i
e j − ek ≡ βi j − ek.
The equivalence in (28) defines the vector βi j. Since A is a coordination game with the
marginal bandwagon property, βi j is an element of conv({ei, e j}), and so ζi j is a convex
combination of ei − ek and e j − ek, as shown in Figure 2.
Next, we define the vector vi j = v ji ∈ R3 by
(29) (vi j)′ = (ζi j)′A =
1
A j−ij−i
(
A j−ij−kA
i + Ai− ji−kA
j − A j−ij−iAk
)
.
By definition (27) of ζi j, (vi j)′x is positive if and only if mixed strategy xi j earns a higher
payoff than mixed strategy x∗ at state x. Both the geometry and the importance of the
vector vi j will be made clear below.
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ei
ej ek
xij
xki
xjk
x*
xiζjk
xkζij*
*
xjζki*
Figure 2: Multiples of the vectors ζi j, ζ jk, and ζki.
4.2 Construction of the value function near the target set
To solve the exit cost problem (14) and the transition cost problem (15) via dynamic
programming, we first determine the form of the value function at states near the target
set. We therefore consider the cost of reaching the set Bk from nearby states in B i. It is
natural to guess that there is a region Rik ⊆ B i whose boundary contains B ik in which
motion in direction ek− ei leads to B ik, and in fact defines the optimal feedback control. By
Lemma 3.4, this choice of control generates the candidate value function
(30) V(x) =
1
2
(Ai−kx)2
Ai−ki−k
in region Rik.
We use Lemma 3.2 to determine when this function satisfies the HJB equation (19) in
Rik. To start, we compute the derivative9 DV : aff(X) → L(TX,R) of V at points in the
interior of Rik:
(31) DV(x)z =
Ai−kx
Ai−ki−k
Ai−kz for x ∈ int(Rik).
9 Since V is defined on aff(X), its derivative at x, DV(x), is a linear map from TX to R. There are many
vectors v ∈ Rn that represent this map, in the sense that DV(x)z = v′z for all z ∈ TX. The gradient of V
at x, ∇V(x), is the defined to be the unique representative of DV(x) in TX; it can be obtained by applying
the orthogonal projection matrix Φ = I − 1n11′ to an arbitrary representative of DV(x) in Rn. See Sandholm
(2010c, Section 3.C) for further discussion.
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Since strategies i and k are both best responses at states in B ik, vectors tangent to B ik are
orthogonal to (Ai−k)′. Equation (31) implies that such vectors zˆ satisfy DV(x)zˆ = 0, and
so are tangent to the level sets of the value function. Intuitively, moving the state in a
direction tangent to B ik changes neither the distance needed to travel to B ik nor the payoff
differences that must be overcome en route.
We now apply Lemma 3.2. To check condition (20), we first observe that
DV(x)(ei − eh) = A
i−kx
Ai−ki−k
Ai−ki−h.
Now Ai−kx ≥ 0 (since x ∈ B i), Ai−ki−k > 0 (since A is a coordination game; see (3)), and
Ai−ki− j ≥ 0 (by the marginal bandwagon property (4)). Thus DV(x)(ei − eh) ≥ 0 for h ∈ { j, k},
establishing condition (20). To check condition (21), we compute as follows:
(DV(x) − (Ax)′) (e j − ek) = A
i−kx
Ai−ki−k
Ai−kj−k − A j−kx
=
1
Ai−ki−k
(
Ak−ik− jA
i−k − Ak−ik−iA j−k
)
x(32)
=
1
Ai−ki−k
(
Ak−ik− jA
i − Ak−ik−iA j + Ai−ki− jAk
)
x(33)
= (vki)′x.
Lemma 3.2 thus yields the following result:
Lemma 4.1. Suppose that the function V is defined by equation (30) on a region Rik ⊆ B i as
specified above. Then the HJB equation (19) for V is satisfied at x ∈ int(Rik) if
(34) (vki)′x ≥ 0.
By our earlier interpretation of vki, inequality (34) requires that at state x, mixed strategy
xki is a weakly better response than mixed strategy x∗.
4.3 The geometry of the initial sufficient condition
We now describe the necessary condition (34) from Lemma 4.1 in geometric terms. In
what follows, it is convenient to endow the strategy set S = {1, 2, 3} with the cyclic order
1 ≺ 2 ≺ 3 ≺ 1. When we refer to the strategies generically, as i, j, and k, we require that
this labeling satisfy i ≺ j ≺ k ≺ i. We give the order a geometric meaning by labeling
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the vertices of the simplex X counterclockwise, as in Figure 2. If R3 is presented in right-
handed coordinates, so that the cross product obeys the right-hand rule, then our labeling
of X corresponds to the view from the “outside”, with the origin lying behind the figure,
and the vector 1 pointing towards us.
Also, recalling the definition (5) and alternating property (6) of the skew, we abuse
notation by writing Q = Qi jk = −Qkji. It follows from the discussion in Section 2.2 that
the three-strategy games with zero skew are the potential games. Games with Q > 0 and
Q < 0 are said to have clockwise skew and counterclockwise skew.10 Since the sign of the skew
can be reversed by renaming the strategies, there is no loss of generality in focusing on
games with zero or clockwise skew.
The following properties of the normal vector vki allow us to locate the states satisfying
inequality (34), and hint at the effects of skew on solutions of our optimal control problems.
It follows from expression (32) for vki, or from our interpretation of vki, that
(35) (vki)′x∗ = 0,
implying that inequality (34) binds at the mixed equilibrium x∗. Moreover, expressions
(32) and (33) for vki and the fact that Ak−ik−i = A
k−i
k− j + A
k−i
j−i imply that
(vki)′(ei − ek) = 1
Ak−ik−i
(
Ak−ik− jA
i−k
i−k − Ak−ik−iA j−ki−k
)
= Q,(36)
(vki)′(ek − e j) = 1
Ak−ik−i
(
Ak−ik− jA
i
k− j − Ak−ik−iA jk− j + Ai−ki− jAkk− j
)
=
1
Ak−ik−i
(
Ak−ik− jA
j−i
j−k + A
k−i
j−iA
j−k
j−k
)
> 0, and
(37)
(vki)′(ei − e j) = 1
Ak−ik−i
(
Ak−ik− jA
i−k
i− j + A
k−i
k−iA
j−k
j−i
)
> 0.(38)
We illustrate the consequences of these relations in Figure 3. Figure 3(i) illustrates
inequality (34) when Q = 0, so that A is a potential game. In this case, equation (36) says
that the line on which (34) binds is parallel to ei − ek. Thus, by our interpretation of vki,
whether mixed strategy xki or mixed strategy x∗ is a better response to state x depends
only on the value of x j. Inequalities (37) and (38) imply that (34) is satisfied at states ei and
ek, but not at state e j, which also agrees with our interpretation of vki.
Figure 3(ii) illustrates inequality (34) when Q > 0, so that A has clockwise skew. In
10For motivation, note that Q = Ai(e j− ek) + A j(ek − ei) + Ak(ei− e j) represents a composite effect on payoffs
of a clockwise circuit of the vertices of X.
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ei
ej ek
xij
xki
xjk
x*
vki
vjkvij
(i) a potential game (Q = 0)
ei
ej ek
xij
x*
vki
vij
vjk
xki
xjk
(ii) a clockwise skewed game (Q > 0)
Figure 3: Skew and inequality (34) in coordination games with the marginal bandwagon property.
The vector v¯ki = Φvki is the orthogonal projection of the normal vector vki onto the tangent space TX.
this case, equation (36) says that the line on which (34) binds is rotated counterclockwise
through x∗ relative to the unskewed case. Inequality (37) implies that this rotation is
less than 60◦, so that the line where (34) binds passes through the same sextant as mixed
equilibrium xi j. Finally, inequality (38) implies that (34) is satisfied at state ei, but not at
state e j.11
To complete the initial step of the analysis, let us consider states that are in the region
Rik ⊆ B i introduced above and that are close toB ik. States in the latter set can be expressed
as x∗ + dζki with d ≥ 0. Since equation (28) says that the vector ζki is a convex combination
of ek − e j and ei − e j, equation (35) and inequalities (37) and (38) imply that
(vki)′(x∗ + dζki) = d (vki)′ζki ≥ 0.
Thus Lemma 4.1 implies that at states in Rik close to B ik, the value function (30) generated
by control ek − ei satisfies the HJB equation (19).
11If Q < 0, similar logic shows that the rotation of the line where (34) binds is clockwise relative to the
unskewed case, and again less than 60◦.
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ei
ej ek
xki
xij˜
xiˆ
xjk
xij
xik˜
x*Bj Bk
Figure 4: Optimal exit paths from B i when xˆi is on face eie j.
5. Characterization of Exit Costs
We now turn to the exit cost problem (14), whose solutions describe the expected time
until the stochastic evolutionary process XN,η escapes an equilibrium’s strong basin of
attraction, as well as the likely point of exit.
To begin, we hypothesize that the optimal feedback control takes the form shown in
Figure 4. There best response regionB i is split into two regions; in one the optimal control
is e j − ei, and exit paths lead to B i j; in the other the optimal control is ek − ei, and exit
paths lead toB ik. The boundary between the regions is a ray whose endpoint is the mixed
equilibrium x∗, and that passes through a state xˆi determined below. From points on this
ray, motion in either basic direction is optimal.
State xˆi is identified in Lemma 5.1. To state the lemma, we define
V j(x) =
1
2
(Ai− jx)2
Ai− ji− j
and Vk(x) =
1
2
(Ai−kx)2
Ai−ki−k
.
By Lemma 3.4, V j(x) is the cost of a path from state x that moves through B i in direction
e j − ei until reaching boundary B i j. Vk(x) is interpreted analogously.
Lemma 5.1. There is a unique state xˆi ∈ B i ∩ bd(X) such that
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xˆij < x
∗
j and xˆ
i
k < x
∗
k ,(39)
(vi j)′xˆi > 0 and (vik)′xˆi > 0, and(40)
V j(xˆi) = Vk(xˆi).(41)
Condition (39) of the lemma says that xˆi places less mass on either strategy j or
strategy k than the mixed equilibrium x∗, and so lies above the dashed lines in Figure 4.
This ensures that motion in direction e j − ei from states to the left of the ray through xˆi
leads to boundary B i j, and that motion in direction ek − ei from states to the right of the
ray leads to B ik. Condition (40) further restricts xˆi to the positive half-spaces defined by
normal vectors vi j and vik (see Figure 3). By Lemma 4.1, these conditions ensure that V j
satisfies the HJB equation (19) to the left of the ray through xˆi, and that Vk satisfies (19) to
the right of the ray. Finally, condition (41) says that from state xˆi, the costs of proceeding
in direction e j − ei to B i j and in direction ek − ei to B ik are equal. Since V j(x) and Vk(x) are
homogenous of degree 2 in the displacement z = x − x∗ from x∗, condition (41) ensures
that V j and Vk match up continuously along the ray from x∗ through xˆi, as required by the
verification theorem.
This last argument illustrates an important general point. Throughout the paper, the
linear inequalities we use to define control regions bind at x∗; so do the linear inequalities
from Lemma 3.2 used to check the HJB equation. Consequently, our construction of the
value function and our arguments to check the HJB equation apply throughout the affine
space aff(X), as required by Theorem 3.1.
The proof of Lemma 5.1 is presented in Appendix A.2. In brief, the proof considers
the behavior of the difference Vk − V j on the lines ` i j = {sei + (1 − s)e j : s ∈ R} and
` ik = {sei + (1−s)ek : s ∈ R} through aff(X) (see Figure 9 in Appendix A.2). It is easy to check
that Vk −V j is quadratic on each of these lines, and that it is concave on ` i j and convex on
` ik. Computations show that Vk − V j admits two zeros on each line; the zeros of interest,
denoted yi j and yik, are those with the larger i components. By definition, these points
satisfy condition (41), and further computations confirm that they satisfy conditions (39)
and (40), and that yi j, yik, and x∗ are collinear. If yi j and yik are both ei, we set xˆi = ei. If not,
exactly one of yi j and yik is in X, and that one is our xˆi.
With Lemma 5.1 in hand, we can describe the value function and the optimal feedback
control for the exit problem. To do so, we define the cross product
wi = x∗ × (xˆi − x∗)
to be a vector normal to segment xˆix∗. By the right-hand rule (see Section 4.3), states
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satisfying (wi)′x > 0 appear to the left of segment xˆix∗ in Figure 4. It is convenient to focus
on controls from the set
X 	 X = {α − β : α, β ∈ X, supp(α) ∩ supp(β) = ∅} = bd(Z),
since every nonzero element of Z is proportional to an element of this set. For concision,
the results to come do not say explicitly that the value function equals zero on the target
sets, nor do they specify that the optimal control on those sets is the null control.
Proposition 5.2. If A is a simple three-strategy coordination game, the value function V∗ : B i →
R+ for the exit cost problem (14) with target set B j ∪ Bk is the continuous function
(42) V∗(x) =

1
2
(Ai−kx)2
Ai−ki−k
if (wi)′x ≤ 0,
1
2
(Ai− jx)2
Ai− ji− j
if (wi)′x > 0.
The optimal feedback controls with range X 	 X are
(43) ν∗(x)

= ek − ei if (wi)′x < 0
∈ {ek − ei, e j − ei} if (wi)′x = 0,
= e j − ei if (wi)′x > 0.
Proof. We apply the verification theorem. The value function V∗ in (42) is constructed
from feedback controls (43) that generate feasible solutions to the exit problem, as required
by condition (i) of Theorem 3.1. The continuity of V follows from Lemma 5.1 and the
argument in the subsequent paragraph. V∗ is clearly C1 off the set {x ∈ aff(X) : (wi)′x = 0},
and Lemmas 4.1 and 5.1 imply that the HJB equation holds away from this set. Thus
condition (ii) of Theorem 3.1 is satisfied, and the proof is complete. 
Proposition 5.2 yields the solution to exit problem (14):
Corollary 5.3. In a simple three-strategy coordination game,
C({ei},B j ∪ Bk) = min{γ(ei, xi j), γ(ei, xki)} = min
12 (Ai− jei)2Ai− ji− j ,
1
2
(Ai−kei)2
Ai−ki−k
 .
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6. Characterization of Transition Costs
In this section, we consider the transition cost problem (15), whose solutions are used
to describe the global long-run behavior of the process XN,η.
Unlike that of exit costs, the analysis of transition costs depends in a basic way on
whether the game at hand is a potential game. To see why, we recall the reasoning from
Section 4.2, where we sought to define a region in B i from which optimal paths to Bk
proceed in direction ek − ei to B ik, generating value function (30) in that region. By Lemma
4.1, this value function is consistent with the HJB equation (19) whenever (vki)′x ≥ 0.
Suppose first that A is a potential game, so that the skew Q equals zero. In this case,
Figure 3(i) shows that states in B i satisfying x j ≤ x∗j , from which motion in direction ek − ei
leads to Bki, also satisfy inequality (34). It is therefore consistent with the analysis so far
for optimal paths to proceed in direction ek − ei to Bk whenever feasible.
If instead A has clockwise skew, so that Q > 0, Figure 3(ii) shows that the same
conclusion about motion from B i to Bk obtains. However, we cannot reach the analogous
conclusion about motion from B j to Bk. In the thin triangle to the left of x∗, motion in
direction ek − e j leads to B jk. But since (v jk)′x < 0 here, this motion is not consistent with
the HJB equation (19). Thus the optimal paths to Bk must take a different form, a form we
determine in Section 6.2.
6.1 Transition costs in potential games
In potential games, the value function for the transition cost problem (15) is easy to
describe, and is even smooth, but the optimal feedback controls are of a degenerate form.
Proposition 6.1. Let A be a simple three-strategy coordination game, and suppose that A is a
potential game. Then the value function V∗ : B i ∪ B j → R+ for the transition cost problem (15)
with target set Bk is the C1 function
(44) V∗(x) =

1
2
(Ai−kx)2
Ai−ki−k
if x j < x∗j ,
1
2
(x − x∗)′A(x − x∗) if x j ≥ x∗j and xi ≥ x∗i ,
1
2
(A j−kx)2
A j−kj−k
if xi < x∗i .
The optimal feedback controls with range X 	 X are
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ei
ej ek
xki
xjk˜
xjk
xij
xik˜
x*
Bk
Figure 5: Optimal transition paths to Bk in a potential game (Q = 0). In the crosshatched regions,
continuous sets of control directions are optimal.
(45) ν∗(x)

= ek − ei if x j < x∗j ,
∈ conv({e j − ei, ek − ei}) if x j ≥ x∗j and Ai− jx > 0,
= −ζi j if Ai− jx = 0,
∈ conv({ei − e j, ek − e j}) if xi ≥ x∗i and Ai− jx < 0,
= ek − e j if xi < x∗i .
The feedback controls (45) are illustrated in Figure 5. At states in the sextant northwest
of x∗ other than those on the ray through xi j, continuous ranges of control vectors are
optimal. This degeneracy is particular to potential games, as we explain below.
Proof of Proposition 6.1. To apply the verification theorem, we first show that V∗ is C1.
This is clearly true inside each of the three regions in the piecewise definition (44). It
remains to consider the behavior of V∗ at states satisfying x j = x∗j or xi = x∗i . We focus on
the former states. Such states satisfy x = x∗ + d(ek − ei) for some d ≥ 0. It follows that V∗ is
continuous at such states, since
V1(x) ≡ 1
2
(Ai−kx)2
Ai−ki−k
=
1
2
d2Ai−ki−k =
1
2
(x − x∗)′A(x − x∗) ≡ V2(x).
To check that V∗ is C1, recall from Section 2.2 that since A is a potential game, we can write
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A = C +1r′ for some symmetric matrix C ∈ Rn×n and some vector r ∈ Rn. Using these facts
and the fact that x∗ is an interior Nash equilibrium of both A and C, we have
V2(x) =
1
2
(x − x∗)′A(x − x∗) = 1
2
(x − x∗)′C(x − x∗) = 1
2
(x − x∗)′Cx(46)
=
1
2
(
x′Cx − x′Cx∗
)
=
1
2
(
x′Cx − (x∗)′Cx∗
)
.
Thus for z ∈ TX, these facts and the symmetry of A with respect to TX × TX yield
(47) DV2(x)z = x′Cz = z′Cx = z′Ax = z′A(x − x∗) = (x − x∗)′Az.
But at states x with x j = x∗j , the fact that Ai−kx∗ = 0 and the definition of d imply that
DV1(x)z =
Ai−kx
Ai−ki−k
Ai−kz =
Ai−k(x − x∗)
Ai−ki−k
Ai−kz = d Ak−iz = (x − x∗)′Az,
so V∗ is C1 at these states.
Next, we show that the value function V∗ is generated by the controls (45). For the first
and third cases of definition (44), this follows from Lemma 3.4. To address the second case,
we require the following lemma, which applies equally well to the other cases (see the
discussion following this proof). The lemma uses the fact that the function f : aff(X)→ R
defined by f (x) = 12x
′Cx is a potential function for F(x) = Ax on aff(X), in the sense that
D f (x)z = F(x)′z = z′Ax for all z ∈ TX and x ∈ aff(X).12
Lemma 6.2. The cost c(φ) of trajectory φ : [0,T]→ aff(X) satisfies c(φ) ≥ f (φ0) − f (φT). If for
each t ∈ (0,T), every strategy h with (φ˙t)h < 0 is optimal at φt, then c(φ) = f (φ0) − f (φT).
Proof. By definition (13) of path costs, and since [φ˙t]′+1 = [φ˙t]′−1 and 1Abˇ(φt)φt ≥ Aφt,
c(φ) =
∫ T
0
[φ˙t]′+(1A
bˇ(φt) − A)φt dt ≥
∫ T
0
(
[φ˙t]′−A − [φ˙t]′+A
)
φt dt
= −
∫ T
0
φ˙′tAφt dt = −
∫ T
0
D f (φt) φ˙t dt = f (φ0) − f (φT).
If the assumption on the support of [φ˙t]− holds, then [φ˙t]′−1Abˇ(φt)φt = [φ˙t]′−Aφt, so the
inequality in the display binds. 
Proceeding with our earlier argument, we note that any controlled path φ : [0,T] →
aff(X) starting from a state x with x j ≥ x∗j and xi ≥ x∗i and generated by controls satisfying
12See Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988) and Sandholm (2001, 2009).
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(45) both satisfies the assumption of Lemma 6.2 and terminates at φT = x∗ (see Figure 5).
Thus Lemma 6.2, the definition of f , and equation (46) yield
c(φ) = f (x) − f (x∗) = 1
2
x′Cx − 1
2
(x∗)′Cx∗ = 1
2
(x − x∗)′A(x − x∗),
as specified in the second case of (44).
The proposition will follow from Theorem 3.1 if we can show that V∗ satisfies the HJB
equation (19) at all states. Since A is a potential game, the states with (vki)′x > 0 are those
satisfying x j < x∗j (see Figure 3(i)), so Lemma 4.1 implies V∗ satisfies (19) at these states.
Analogous reasoning shows that V∗ satisfies (19) when xi < x∗i . It thus remains to check
(19) at states satisfying x j ≥ x∗j and xi ≥ x∗i . To do so, we show that (19) holds when x j ≥ x∗j
and Ai− jx > 0; the argument when xi ≥ x∗i and Ai− jx < 0 is similar; and then (19) must hold
when x j = x∗j , xi = x∗i , or Ai− jx = 0 by virtue of the fact that V∗ is C1.
So suppose that x satisfies x j ≥ x∗j and Ai− jx > 0. Since DV∗(x)z = z′Ax at such states
by equation (47), substitution into the HJB equation (19) yields
(48) min
ea,eb,ea
(ei − eb)′Ax = 0.
Since x is in B i but not in B j or Bk (see Figure 5), minimization in (48) requires setting
eb = ei. Then choosing ea to be either e j or ek attains the minimum of 0.13 This completes
the proof of the proposition. 
Because the integrand of the cost function (13) is piecewise linear in the control u = φ˙t,
it is natural to expect the optimal control in X 	 X to be unique at almost all states. That
this is not true here is a consequence of the integrability properties that define potential
games, a point we now consider from two points of view.
First, along any controlled trajectory generated by (45), agents only switch from optimal
strategies to suboptimal strategies. Thus Lemma 6.2 implies that for every state x, V∗(x)
is equal to the change in potential between state x and the terminal state of the controlled
trajectory. When there are multiple controlled trajectories between the initial and terminal
states, as in the second and fourth cases of (45), each achieves this same minimal cost.14
13To consider all controls in X 	 X, we must write the HJB equation in form (18); then the previous
argument and the piecewise linearity of (18) implies that the set of optimal controls is conv({e j − ei, ek − ei}),
as described in the second case of (45).
14To address a possible misconception, let us consider an initial state x = (1 − c)ei + ce j with c ∈ (0, x∗j ).
Proposition 6.1 says that the optimal path from x to Bk proceeds in direction ek − ei until reaching the state
y ∈ B ik with y j = c. The argument above shows that this path’s cost is f (x) − f (y). One might wonder why
there is not a lower cost path that terminates at the mixed equilibrium xki: since f (xki) is greater than f (y),
f (x) − f (xki) is less than f (x) − f (y). But along any path from x that first hits B ik at xki, some agents must
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Second, we argue that A being a potential game is a necessary condition for having a
region in B i where both e j − ei and ek − ei are optimal controls. Equation (22) implies that
in the interior of such a region, the value function must satisfy
DV(x)(e j − ei) = A j−ix and DV(x)(ek − ei) = Ak−ix.
Since e j − ei and ek − ei span TX, these equalities imply that
DV(x)z = z′Ax for all z ∈ TX.
Thus the second derivative D2V(x) is given by
D2V(x)(z, zˆ) = z′Azˆ for all z, zˆ ∈ TX.
The first expression is symmetric in z and zˆ, by virtue of being a second derivative. Thus
A is symmetric with respect to TX × TX, and so is a potential game.
Proposition 6.1 yields the solution to the transition cost problem (15) in potential games.
Corollary 6.3. If the simple three-strategy coordination game A = C + 1r′ is a potential game, so
that f (x) = 12x
′Cx is a potential function for F(x) = Ax, then
C({ei},Bk) = γ(ei, xki) = 12
(Ai−kei)2
Ai−ki−k
= f (ei) − f (xki).
6.2 Transition costs in skewed games
We now consider the transition cost problem (15) in games with clockwise skew: Q > 0.
It is natural to expect that if the skew Q is small, then the optimal control should
resemble the one from the Q = 0 case from Figure 5. The previous discussion shows that
once Q is positive, no region will have multiple optimal controls. Thus the form of the
control in the sextant northwest of x∗ must change.
At the start of this section, we argued that in clockwise-skewed games, motion from
B i to Bki in direction ek − ei is consistent with the HJB equation whenever such a path
exists. We therefore hypothesize that motion is in direction ek − ei throughout the interior
of B i, even when such motion leads to boundary B i j. We also saw that motion from B j
to B jk in direction ek − e j is not always consistent with the HJB equation. This leads us to
abandon the suboptimal strategy j. Thus Lemma 6.2 does not apply, and indeed, the cost of such a path
exceeds f (x) − f (xki). The cheapest path from x to xki goes first from x to y at cost f (x) − f (y), and then from
y to xi j at zero cost. Proposition 6.1 implies that no path can reach xi j more cheaply.
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hypothesize that in a portion of B j close to B i j, motion will instead be in direction ei − e j.
The conjectured form of the optimal control is pictured in Figures 6 and 7. In the
sextant northwest of x∗, the multiple optimal controls from Figure 5 have been replaced in
Figures 6 and 7 with selections from these controls. The boundary B i j is approached from
states on both sides, but it is approached obliquely from the B i side, and nearly squarely
from the B j side. In the remainder of this section, we prove that that the optimal value
function is generated by feedback controls of the form shown in these figures.
To begin, we introduce notation for the endpoints of paths that proceed in a basic
direction until reaching a boundary between best response regions. Using Lemma 3.4,
and proceeding from top to bottom in Figure 6 or 7, we have
for x ∈ B i with x j ≤ x∗j , let ωik(x) = x + (ek − ei)dik(x) ∈ Bki, where dik(x) =
Ai−kx
Ai−ki−k
,
for x ∈ B i with x j ≥ x∗j , let χik(x) = x + (ek − ei)δik(x) ∈ B i j, where δik(x) =
Ai− jx
Ai− ji−k
,
for x ∈ B j with xk ≤ x∗k , let χ ji(x) = x + (ei − e j)d ji(x) ∈ B i j, where d ji(x) =
A j−ix
A j−ij−i
,
for x ∈ B j with xi ≤ x∗i , let ω jk(x) = x + (ek − e j)d jk(x) ∈ B jk, where d jk(x) =
A j−kx
A j−kj−k
.
Using these definitions, we can define the pieces of the value function. Again proceeding
from top to bottom, we have
V1(x) = γ(x, ωik(x)),
V2(x) = γ(x, χik(x)) + γ(χik(x), x∗),
V3(x) = γ(x, χ ji(x)) + γ(χ ji(x), x∗),
V4(x) = γ(x, ω jk(x)).
Looking at Figures 6 and 7, the only characteristic of the proposed value function that
remains ambiguous is the boundary between the regions where definitions V3 and V4
apply. In the figure, this boundary is a ray from mixed equilibrium x∗ through a state xˆ jk
on the boundary of X. This state is identified in the following lemma.
Lemma 6.4. If A has clockwise skew, then there is a unique state xˆ jk ∈ B j ∩ bd(X) such that
xˆ jkk < x
∗
k ,(49)
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ei
ej ek
xki
xjk˜
xjkˆ
xjk
xij
xik˜
x*
Bk
Figure 6: Optimal transition paths to Bk in a clockwise skewed game when xˆ jk is on face eie j.
ei
ej ek
xki
xjk˜
xjkˆ xjk
xij
xik˜
x*
Bk
Figure 7: Optimal transition paths to Bk in a clockwise skewed game when xˆ jk is on face e jek.
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(v jk)′xˆ jk > 0, and(50)
V3(xˆ jk) = V4(xˆ jk).(51)
The requirement that xˆ jk ∈ B j ∩ bd(X) means that xˆ jk lies on the southwest portion of
bd(X), between mixed equilibria xi j and x jk. Condition (49) says that xˆ jk lies to the left of
the line on which xk = x∗k , so that motion from xˆ jk in direction ei−e j leads toB i j (rather than
B jk). Condition (50) says that xˆ jk is below the line where (v jk)′x = 0. Since Q is positive,
it follows that xˆ jki < x
∗
i (see Figure 3(ii)), and thus that motion from xˆ
jk in direction ek − e j
leads to B jk. Finally, condition (51) says that the same cost accrues along the two paths
from xˆ jk to Bk indicated in Figure 6: the concatenation of the linear segment from xˆ jk in
direction ei − e j to χ ji(x) ∈ B i j and the segment from χ ji(x) to x∗, whose total cost is V3(xˆ jk),
and the direct path from xˆ jk in direction ek − e j to ω jk(x) ∈ B jk, whose cost is V4(xˆ jk). The
proof of Lemma 6.4 follows lines similar to the proof of Lemma 5.1, and is presented in
Appendix A.3.2.
To state the main result of this section, we define the vector w jk to be the cross product
w jk = x∗ × (xˆ jk − x∗).
In Figures 6 and 7, the states satisfying (w jk)′x > 0 are those below the ray from x∗ through
xˆ jk.
Proposition 6.5. Let A be a simple three-strategy coordination game with clockwise skew. Then
the value function V∗ : B i ∪ B j → R+ for the transition cost problem (15) with target set Bk is
(52) V∗(x) =

γ(x, ωik(x)) if x j ≤ x∗j
γ(x, χik(x)) + γ(χik(x), x∗) if x j > x∗j and Ai− jx ≥ 0,
γ(x, χ ji(x)) + γ(χ ji(x), x∗) if Ai− jx < 0 and (w jk)′x < 0,
γ(x, ω jk(x)) if (w jk)′x ≥ 0,
The optimal feedback controls with range X 	 X are
(53) ν∗(x)

= ek − ei if Ai− jx > 0,
= −ζi j if Ai− jx = 0,
= ei − e j if Ai− jx < 0 and (w jk)′x < 0,
∈ {ei − e j, ek − e j} if (w jk)′x = 0,
= ek − e j if (w jk)′x > 0.
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In Appendix A.3, we prove Proposition 6.5 by establishing that the value function
defined in (52) satisfies the conditions of the verification theorem. After some preliminary
calculations (Appendix A.3.1) and the proof of Lemma 6.4 (Appendix A.3.2), we show
in Appendix A.3.3 that V is continuous, and that it is differentiable except at states x at
which (w jk)′x = 0. In Appendix A.3.4, we use Lemmas 3.2, 4.1, and 6.4 to show that the
HJB equation holds at all other states. The proposition then follows from Theorem 3.1.
Proposition 6.5 implies that in clockwise-skewed games, the possible optimal tran-
sition paths depend on the ordering of the strategy pair in question. For a clockwise
transition, from ei to Bk, the optimal path is always the direct boundary path to xki. For a
counterclockwise transition, from e j to Bk, the optimal path is either the direct boundary
path to x jk (Figure 6), or a two-segment path that proceeds first to mixed equilibrium xi j,
and from there to interior equilibrium x∗ (Figure 7). To summarize:
Corollary 6.6. In a simple three-strategy coordination game with clockwise skew,
C({ei},Bk) = γ(ei, xki) = 12
(Ai−kei)2
Ai−ki−k
and
C({e j},Bk) = min
{
γ(e j, x jk), γ(e j, xi j) + γ(xi j, x∗)
}
= min
{
1
2
(A j−ke j)2
A j−kj−k
,
1
2
(A j−iei)2
A j−ij−i
+
1
2
(x∗k )2(ζi j)′Aζi j
}
.
Remark 6.7. It is worth comparing the exit and transition costs for simple three-strategy
coordination games under the logit protocol to those under the BRM protocol of Kandori
et al. (1993), in which any switch to a suboptimal strategy has unlikelihood 1. Under
the latter, the least cost exit path from ei to B j ∪ Bk follows a boundary to either mixed
equilibrium xi j or mixed equilibrium xki, since these are the states in B i j and Bki at which
xi is largest. Thus exit costs under the BRM protocol are
CBRM({ei},B j ∪ Bk) = min{xi jj , xkik } = min
{
Ai− jei
Ai− ji− j
,
Ai−kei
Ai−ki−k
}
,
where the last expressions follow from Lemma 3.4. Thus the candidate paths are the same
as in the logit model. But since the cost of a given path differs in the two models, the
identity of the optimal exit path may differ as well.
Turning to the transition problem, results of Kandori and Rob (1998) imply that under
the BRM protocol, the optimal path from ei to B `, ` ∈ { j, k} is the direct boundary path to
–31–
mixed equilibrium xi`.15 Thus transition costs are given by
CBRM({ei},B `) = xi`` =
Ai−`ei
Ai−`i−`
.
In particular, in the games considered here, optimal BRM transition paths never pass
through the interior of the simplex, as they may in the logit model.
7. Stationary Distribution Asymptotics and Stochastic Stability
We now combine results from Section 6 with ones from SS to draw conclusions about
the global behavior of the stochastic evolutionary process XN,η in the small noise double
limit. Since this process is irreducible, its long run behavior is described by its unique
stationary distribution, denoted µN,η. State x ∈ X is stochastically stable in the small noise
double limit if
− lim
N→∞ limη→0
η
N logµ
N,η(x) = 0.
When the population size N is large enough, the mass placed by µN,η on any neighborhood
of such a state does not vanish at an exponential rate as the noise level η approaches zero;
see SS Section 6 for further discussion.
As a first application, we characterize the asymptotic behavior of the stationary distri-
butions µN,η in the small noise double limit when A is a simple three-strategy coordination
game and a potential game.
Proposition 7.1. Let A = C + 1r′ be a simple three-strategy coordination game and a potential
game. Let f (x) = 12x
′Cx be a potential function for F(x) = Ax, and let ∆+f (x) = maxi∈S f (ei)− f (x).
Then
(54) lim
N→∞ limη→0 maxx∈XN
∣∣∣− ηN logµN,η(x) − ∆+f (x)∣∣∣ = 0.
In words, the proposition says that when N is large, the exponential rate of decay of
µN,η(x) as η approaches zero is approximately N∆+f (x), where ∆+f (x) ≥ 0 is the deficit in
15For a proof, observe first that in simple three-strategy coordination games, xi`i ≥ x∗i (see Figure 2). The
previous paragraph showed that the direct boundary path from ei to B` is optimal among those that do not
enter Bh, h < {i, `}. This path’s cost is xi`` = 1 − xi`i ≤ 1 − x∗i = x∗` + x∗h . But any transition path that enters Bh
must have at least this cost, since reaching Bh entails a cost of at least xihh ≥ x∗h due to switches from i to h,
plus a cost of at least x∗` due to switches from either i or h to `.
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potential of state x relative to the maximizers of potential. Thus the latter states are the
stochastically stable states in the small noise double limit.
The proof of Proposition 7.1 combines the analysis in Section 6.1 with the characteri-
zation of stationary distribution asymptotics from SS. We abuse notation in what follows
by identifying singleton sets with their lone elements (e.g., by writing C(e j, ei) in place of
C({e j}, {ei}) ).
Proof. We start by finding the minimal cost R(ei) of an ei-tree. Since the three ei-trees
are {(e j, ei), (ek, ei)}, {(ek, e j), (e j, ei)}, and {(e j, ek), (ek, ei)}, Corollary 6.3 implies that
R(ei) = min{C(e j, ei) + C(ek, ei),C(ek, e j) + C(e j, ei),C(e j, ek) + C(ek, ei)}
= min{( f (e j) − f (xi j)) + ( f (ek) − f (xki)), ( f (ek) − f (x jk)) + ( f (e j) − f (xi j)),
( f (e j) − f (x jk)) + ( f (ek) − f (xki))}
= f (e j) + f (ek) −max{ f (xi j) + f (xki), f (x jk) + f (xi j), f (x jk) + f (xki)}
= − f (ei) +
(
f (ei) + f (e j) + f (ek) −max{ f (xi j) + f (xki), f (x jk) + f (xi j), f (x jk) + f (xki)}
)
.
In the final expression, the term in parentheses, henceforth denoted K, does not depend
on the choice of ei.
Next, it follows from Lemma 6.2 that for any x ∈ X,
(55) − f (ei) + C(ei, x) ≥ − f (ei) + ( f (ei) − f (x)) = − f (x).
If x ∈ B i, then along the straight-line path from ei to x only the optimal strategy i loses
mass, so Lemma 6.2 implies that the inequality in (55) binds.
Combining these facts yields
r(x) ≡ min
i∈S
(R(ei) + C(ei, x)) = − f (x) + K.
Since A is a coordination game, the potential function f is maximized at a pure state, so
∆r(x) ≡ r(x) −min
y∈X r(y) = − f (x) −miny∈X (− f (y)) = − f (x) + maxi∈S f (ei) = ∆
+f (x).
The proposition thus follows from SS Theorem 6.3. 
The close connection between stationary distributions and potential functions in po-
tential games has been understood since the work of Blume (1993, 1997). Building on
Blume’s work, Sandholm (2010c, Corollary 12.2.5) derives statement (54) for a particular
specification of the process XN,η. In this specification, not only the limit game F, but also
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all of the finite-population games FN are assumed to be potential games. This definition
ensures that XN,η is reversible for each (N, η) pair, and so that each stationary distribution
µN,η admits a simple closed form.16 Equation (54) is obtained by taking the limit of these
explicit formulas.
In the present analysis, we only assume that the the finite-population games FN con-
verge to a limiting potential game F. This assumption does not requireXN,η to be reversible,
and so explicit expressions for µN,η are generally unavailable. We describe the asymptotics
of the stationary distribution under this weaker assumption by way of the large devia-
tions properties of the stochastic processes. Doing so provides a intuition about the forces
behind the selection of the potential maximizer. Since transition costs are determined by
differences in potential, the transitions used in every minimum cost tree pass through
the same mixed equilibria, so that differences in the trees’ costs are due to differences in
potential at the trees’ roots.
While Proposition 7.1 focuses on simple three-strategy coordination games, similar
conclusions can be reached in potential games outside of this class. Benaı¨m et al. (2014)
explore this idea in in the context of large population limits.
The next example provides explicit computations of stochastically stable states under
the logit protocol, and compares these predictions with those under the BRM protocol.
Example 7.2. Consider the game F(x) = Ax with
A =

7 0 0
2 − q 6 0
2 0 5
 ,
where q ∈ [0, 5). For each such q, A is a simple coordination game17 with interior equi-
librium x∗ = ( 617+q , 5+q17+q , 617+q ). The mixed equilibria on the boundary of X are x12 =
( 611+q ,
5+q
11+q , 0), x
23 = (0, 511 ,
6
11 ), and x
31 = ( 12 , 0,
1
2 ). The parameter q is the skew of A. Thus
when q = 0, A is a potential game.18
To evaluate stochastic stability, we compute the costs of the direct paths from each
pure state to the two adjacent mixed equilibria on the boundary of X, as well as the costs
of the direct paths from the boundary mixed equilibria to the interior equilibrium x∗. We
present these path costs in Figure 8(i).
Next, when q is positive, we determine whether the optimal path for each counter-
16See Sandholm (2010c, Theorem 11.5.12).
17For the marginal bandwagon property (4), note that A3−23−1 = 5 − q.
18In this case, A admits the decomposition A = C + 1r′ with C =
(
5 0 0
0 6 0
0 0 5
)
and r′ = ( 2 0 0 ).
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(ii) BRM
Figure 8: The path costs needed to determine transition costs in Example 7.2.
clockwise transition from e j toBk is the direct path to x jk or the two-segment path via xi j to
x∗ (see Corollary 6.6 and Figures 6 and 7). In the present example, the boundary paths are
optimal for every q ∈ (0, 5). Corollary 6.3 implies that they are also optimal when q = 0.
We then determine the minimum cost R(ei) of an ei tree for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Simple calcula-
tions show that
R(e1) = C(e3, e2) + C(e2, e1) = 2522 +
18
11+q ,
R(e2) =
C(e3, e2) + C(e1, e2) =
25
22 +
(5+q)2
2(11+q) if q ≤ 14 (−15 +
√
265) ≈ .3197,
C(e3, e2) + C(e1, e3) = 2522 +
25
20 otherwise,
R(e3) =
C(e1, e2) + C(e2, e3) =
(5+q)2
2(11+q) +
18
11 if q ≤ 522 ,
C(e2, e1) + C(e1, e3) = 1811+q +
25
20 otherwise.
Further calculations show that R(e2) is smallest when q ∈ [0, 175 ], and that R(e1) is smallest
when q ∈ [175 , 5). Therefore, SS Theorem 6.3 implies that under the logit protocol, state e2
is stochastically stable in the small noise double limit in the former case, and state e1 is in
the latter; both are stochastically stable when q = 175 .
We now compare these selection results to those obtained under the BRM protocol.19
19We consider the version of the BRM protocol under which all optimal strategies are chosen with
nonnegligible probability. Since the convergence results in SS do not apply to the BRM model, we cannot
appeal to them here. But in the present example, the intermediate results needed to establish stochastic
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Remark 6.7 states that under this protocol, optimal transition paths in simple coordination
games are direct. The BRM costs of the six relevant paths can be read directly from the
coordinates of the boundary equilibria; they are shown in Figure 8(ii). Calculations show
that the minimal tree costs are
RBRM(e1) = CBRM(e3, e2) + CBRM(e2, e1) = 511 +
6
11+q ,
RBRM(e2) =
C
BRM(e3, e2) + CBRM(e1, e2) = 511 +
5+q
11+q if q ≤ 1,
CBRM(e3, e2) + CBRM(e1, e3) = 511 +
5
10 otherwise,
RBRM(e3) =
C
BRM(e1, e2) + CBRM(e2, e3) =
5+q
11+q +
6
11 if q ≤ 1123 ,
CBRM(e2, e1) + CBRM(e1, e3) = 611+q +
5
10 otherwise.
Finding the smallest of these costs, we conclude that under the BRM protocol, state e2 is
stochastically stable when q ∈ [0, 1), and state e1 is stochastically stable when q ∈ (1, 5).
To compare predictions under the two protocols, it is useful to focus on the minimal cost
trees themselves. Under the logit protocol, three trees have minimal cost for some q ∈ [0, 5):
the e2-tree {(e3, e2), (e1, e2)} for q ∈ [0, qˆ], qˆ ≈ .3197; the e2-tree {(e3, e2), (e1, e3)} for q ∈ [qˆ, 175 );
and the e1-tree {(e3, e2), (e2, e1)} for q ∈ [175 , 5). Under the BRM protocol, only the first and
last of these have minimal costs, according to whether q ∈ [0, 1] or q ∈ [1, 5). By way of
explanation, notice that as q increases, so does the payoff disadvantage 7 − (2 − q) = 5 + q
of strategy 2 at state e1. This causes the cost of the (e1, e2) transition to grow more rapidly
under logit than under BRM, so that the optimal logit e2-tree abandons this transition
earlier than the optimal BRM e2-tree.
Under both protocols, the stochastically stable state switches from equilibrium e2 to
efficient equilibrium e1 as q increases. But the switch occurs sooner for BRM: for q ∈ (1, 175 ),
BRM selects e1, while logit selects e2. Under BRM, the selection switches once strategy
1 begins to pairwise risk dominate strategy 2. This would follow from classic results in
the absence of strategy 3, and the fact that transition (e3, e2), which heads away from e3,
appears in all BRM minimal cost trees ensures that strategy 3’s presence does not affect the
selection. In contrast, as noted above, transition (e1, e3), which heads into e3, is in the logit
minimal cost tree for intermediate values of q. Its appearance there reflects the advantage
of the indirect route from e1 to e2 via e3 over the direct route, and explains why strategy 2
persists as stochastically stable despite being pairwise risk dominated by strategy 1.
As q increases through 175 , the logit minimal cost tree replaces transition (e1, e3) with
stability follow from elementary considerations, provided that the minimal cost tree is unique. Compare
Kandori and Rob (1995, 1998).
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transition (e2, e1), changing the stochastically stable state from e2 to e1. The former transition
must overcome an initial payoff disadvantage of 7 − 2 = 5, compared to 6 − 0 = 6 for the
latter, leading the former to be less costly at low values of q. As q increases, mixed
equilibrium x12 moves closer to state e2, causing the payoff advantage of strategy 2 over
strategy 1 to dissipate more quickly as the state moves from e2 toward e1. This reduces the
cost of the (e2, e1) transition under the logit protocol, and leads to the replacement of e2 by
e1 as the stochastically stable state. _
8. Discussion
By combining results from Sandholm and Staudigl (2014) with analyses of optimal
control problems, this paper characterized the long-run behavior of a class of stochastic
evolutionary processes in the small noise double limit. Our focus here was on evolution
in simple three-strategy coordination games under the logit protocol. We conclude by
discussing the prospects for extending our analysis to other games and choice rules.
To evaluate these prospects, recall that the running cost appearing in the path cost
integral (11) is L(x,u) = [u]′+Υ(F(x)), where Υ is the unlikelihood function (10) of the
revision protocol. The piecewise linearity of L in the control u = φ˙t ensures that at each
state x, the optimal choices of u in the HJB equation (17) include extreme points of the
control set Z = conv({ei − e j : i, j ∈ S}). Thus for any game and revision protocol, we expect
optimal feedback controls for the exit and transition problems (14) and (15) to partition
the state space into regions in which the various basic directions ei − e j are followed.
The logit protocol (1) is particularly convenient because its unlikelihood function (12)
is piecewise linear in the payoff vector, and thus piecewise linear in the state when the
limit payoff function F(x) = Ax is linear. This leads the value functions for problems
(14) and (15) to be piecewise quadratic; in particular, they are homogeneous of degree
2 in the displacement of the state from an interior equilibrium x∗. This ensures that the
optimal feedback controls partition the state space into convex sets with common extreme
point x∗, as shown in Figures 4–7. This structure should be preserved by certain other
revision protocols. Under the probit protocol (Myatt and Wallace (2003), Dokumacı and
Sandholm (2011)), the unlikelihood function is piecewise quadratic. This should lead
to value functions that are piecewise cubic—specifically, homogeneous of degree 3 in
the displacement of the state from x∗—so that in the class of games studied here, the
boundaries between control regions are again rays emanating from x∗.
Returning to the logit protocol, the piecewise linearity of running costs L(x,u) in both
the control u and the state x suggests that the exit and transition problems can be solved
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beyond the class of simple three-strategy coordination games studied here. The main new
consideration in solving control problems (14) and (15) for general linear games is that
the state constraints, which require controlled trajectories to stay in the state space X, may
bind. The fact that these constraints are slack in the games studied here allowed us to
appeal to a verification theorem, Theorem 3.1, that does not include such constraints. To
handle more general cases, one would need to extend the verification theorem to allow
for linear state constraints. For the class of problems generated by the logit protocol, we
see no conceptual difficulty in obtaining this extension. Still, the proof of Theorem 3.1 is
not simple, and extending it to incorporate state constraints is a challenge we leave for
future research.
A. Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.2
We start by deriving equation (22). Since V is constructed from a feedback control that
equals ek − ei in a neighborhood of x ∈ int(B i), Lemma 3.3 implies that
V(x + t(ei − ek)) − V(x) = γ(x + t(ei − ek), x) = tAi−kx + t
2
2
Ai−ki−k
for t close to zero. Thus
DV(x)(ek − ei) = −
( d
dt
γ(x + t(ei − ek), x)
) ∣∣∣∣∣∣
t=0
= Ak−ix,
which is equivalent to equation (22).
To verify the HJB equation (19), we must show that the the function to be minimized,
H(ea, eb) = (ei − ea)′Ax + DV(x)′(ea − eb),
is nonnegative at each of the five choices of (ea, eb) other than (ek, ei). And indeed,
H(ei, eh) = DV(x)(ei − eh) ≥ 0 for h ∈ { j, k} by (20),
H(e j, ei) = (DV(x) − (Ax)′) (e j − ei) = (DV(x) − (Ax)′) (e j − ek) ≥ 0 by (22) and (21),
H(ek, e j) = (ei − ek)′Ax + DV(x)(ek − e j) = DV(x)(ei − e j) ≥ 0 by (22) and (20), and
H(e j, ek) = (ei − e j)′Ax + DV(x)(e j − ek) ≥ (ei − ek)′Ax ≥ 0 by (21) and the fact that x ∈ B i.
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Figure 9: The construction of xˆi when it is on face ekei and Q > 0.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 5.1
For concreteness, we assume that Q ≥ 0. The proof when Q < 0 is essentially the same,
but with strategies j and k interchanged.
Let x˜ik = x∗ + x∗k (ei − ek) = (x∗i + x∗k )ei + x∗j e j and x˜i j = x∗ + x∗j (ei − e j) = (x∗i + x∗j )ei + x∗k ek
(see Figure 9). We start by establishing
Lemma A.1. Vk(x˜ik) > V j(x˜ik) and Vk(x˜i j) < V j(x˜i j).
Proof. Observe that
Vk(x˜ik) − V j(x˜ik) = 1
2
 (Ai−k(x∗ + x∗k (ei − ek)))2Ai−ki−k −
(Ai− j(x∗ + x∗k (ei − ek)))2
Ai− ji− j

=
(x∗k )2
2
Ai−ki−k − (A
i− j
i−k)
2
Ai− ji− j
 .
Thus to prove the first inequality, it suffices to show that Ai− ji− jA
i−k
i−k−(Ai− ji−k)2 > 0. And indeed,
Ai− ji− jA
i−k
i−k − Ai− ji−kAi− ji−k = Ai− ji− jAi−ki−k − Ai− ji− jAi− ji−k − Ai− jj−kAi− ji−k = A j−ij−kAi− ji−k + Ai− ji− jAk− jk−i > 0.
Interchanging j and k in these calculations proves the second inequality. 
Next, let ` i j = {sei + (1−s)e j : s ∈ R}. The directional derivative of the quadratic function
Vk − V j along this line is evaluated as follows:
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(DVk(x) −DV j(x))(ei − e j) =
Ai−kxAi−ki−k Ai−k − A
i− jx
Ai− ji− j
Ai− j
 (ei − e j)(56)
=
Ai−kx
Ai−ki−k
Ai−ki− j − Ai− jx
=
1
Ai−ki−k
(
Ai−ki− jA
i−k − Ai−ki−kAi− j
)
x
=
1
Ai−ki−k
(
−Ak−ik− jAi + Ai−ki−kA j − Ai−ki− jAk
)
x
= −(vki)′x.
Thus on ` i j, Vk−V j is concave and is maximized at the unique state xˇik satisfying (vki)′x = 0
(see Figure 9).
Recall that x˜ik = x∗ + x∗k (ei − ek) = x∗j e j + (x∗i + x∗k )ei ∈ ` i j, and let x˜ jk = x∗ + x∗k (e j − ek) =
x∗i ei + (x∗j + x∗k )e j ∈ ` i j. Since Q ≥ 0, equations (35) and (36) and inequality (37) imply that
(vki)′x˜ik = x∗k Q ≥ 0 and that (vki)′x˜ jk < 0. Thus xˇik lies between x˜ik and x˜ jk, and is equal to
the former if and only if Q = 0 (again, see Figure 9). Since Vk(x˜ik) > V j(x˜ik) by Lemma A.1
and since Vk − V j is concave quadratic on ` i j, we have
Lemma A.2. There is a unique state yi j ∈ ` i j with yi ji > xˇiki ≥ x∗i such that Vk(yi j) = V j(yi j).
Next, we consider directional derivative of the quadratic function Vk − V j along line
` ik = {sei + (1 − s)ek : s ∈ R}. A calculation similar to (56) shows that
(DVk(x) −DV j(x))(ei − ek) = 1
Ai− ji− j
(
Ai− ji− jA
i−k − Ai− ji−kAi− j
)
x = (vi j)′x.
Thus on ` ik, Vk − V j is convex and is minimized at the unique state xˇi j on ` ik satisfying
(vi j)′x = 0 (once again, see Figure 9). Since Q ≥ 0, equations (35) and (36) and inequality
(37) imply that xˇi j = x˜i j + c(ei − ek) for some c ≥ 0, with equality only if and only if Q = 0.
Since Vk(x˜i j) < V j(x˜i j) by Lemma A.1 and since Vk −V j is convex quadratic on ` ik, we have
Lemma A.3. There is a unique state yik ∈ ` ik with yiki > xˇi ji ≥ x˜i ji such that Vk(yik) = V j(yik).
To complete the proof, we use the homogeneity of degree 2 of V j(x) and Vk(x) in the
displacement z = x − x∗ of x from x∗. Specifically, for z ∈ TX and s ∈ R, we have
Vk(x∗+sz)−V j(x∗+sz) = Vk(sz)−V j(sz) = s2
(
Vk(z) − V j(z)
)
= s2
(
Vk(x∗ + z) − V j(x∗ + z)
)
.
Thus if Vk(x∗ + z) = V j(x∗ + z), then Vk(x∗ + sz) = V j(x∗ + sz) for all s ∈ R. It therefore
follows from Lemmas A.2 and A.3 that yi j and yik are collinear with x∗ (see Figure 9), and
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so that both of these points satisfy (39), (40), and (41). It could be that yi j = yik = ei, in
which case we choose xˆi = ei. Otherwise, exactly one of yi j and yik is in X, in which case
we choose xˆi to be this state. This completes the proof of the lemma.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 6.5
A.3.1 Preliminary calculations
We start by stating a counterpart of Lemma 3.4 for paths along B i j to x∗.
Lemma A.4. If y ∈ B i j, then
y = x∗ + dζ(y)ζi j, where dζ(y) = x∗k − yk, and(57)
γ(y, x∗) = 1
2
dζ(y)2Aζζ, where A
ζ
ζ = (ζ
i j)′Aζi j > 0.
Proof. Since y ∈ conv({xi j, x∗}), (27) implies that we can write y = x∗ + dζi j for some
d > 0. Then (28) implies that yk = x∗k − d, which yields (57), and Lemma 3.3 implies that
γ(y, x∗) = (y − x∗)′A
(
y + x∗
2
)
= dζ(y)(ζi j)′A(x∗ + 12dζ(y)ζi j)
=
1
2
dζ(y)2Aζζ. 
Lemma A.4 gives an expression for dζ(y) that is affine in y. To match Lemma 3.4, one
can instead write dζ(y) = (ζi j)′Ay/Aζζ. The key point is that either way, d
ζ(x∗ + z) is linear
in the displacement z.
Next we give explicit expressions for each piece of the value function and their deriva-
tives.
V1(x) = γ(x, ωik(x)) =
1
2
dik(x)2Ai−ki−k =
1
2
(Ai−kx)2
Ai−ki−k
, so
DV1(x) =
Ai−kx
Ai−ki−k
Ai−k;
V2(x) = γ(x, χik(x)) + γ(χik(x), x∗)
= δik(x)Ai−kχik(x) +
1
2
δik(x)2Ai−ki−k +
1
2
dζ(χik(x))2Aζζ, so
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DV2(x) = δik(x)Ai−kDχik(x) + Ai−kχik(x)Dδik(x) + Ai−ki−kδ
ik(x)Dδik(x)
+ Aζζd
ζ(χik(x))Ddζ(χik(x))Dχik(x);
V3(x) = γ(x, χ ji(x)) + γ(χ ji(x), x∗) = 1
2
d ji(x)2A j−ij−i +
1
2
dζ(χ ji(x))2Aζζ, so
DV3(x) = A j−ij−id
ji(x)Dd ji(x) + Aζζd
ζ(χ ji(x))Ddζ(χ ji(x))Dχ ji(x); and
V4(x) = γ(x, ω jk(x)) =
1
2
d jk(x)2A j−kj−k =
1
2
(A j−kx)2
A j−kj−k
, so
DV4(x) =
A j−kx
A j−kj−k
A j−k.
The functions above are expressed in terms of derivatives of linear functions from
Section 6.2 and Lemma A.4. These derivatives are written explicitly as follows:
Dδik(x) =
Ai− j
Ai− ji−k
,
Dχik(x) = I + (ek − ei)Dδik(x) = I + (ek − ei)A
i− j
Ai− ji−k
,
Dd ji(x) =
A j−i
A j−ij−i
,
Dχ ji(x) = I + (ei − e j)Dd ji(x) = I + (ei − e j)A
j−i
A j−ij−i
, and
Ddζ(y) = −e′k for y ∈ B i j.
The remainder of the proof makes extensive use of the expressions above. While the
algebraic presentation below may look complicated, many of the arguments are quite
simple when interpreted geometrically.
A.3.2 Proof of Lemma 6.4
We consider the behavior of the quadratic function V4 − V3 on the line ` i j = {sei + (1 −
s)e j : s ∈ R}. To begin, note that since Dχ ji(x)(e j − ei) = 0, a calculation similar to (56) shows
that
(DV4(x) −DV3(x))(e j − ei) = 1
A j−kj−k
(
A j−kj−i A
j−k − A j−kj−kA j−i
)
x = −(v jk)′x.
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Figure 10: The construction of xˆ jk when it is on face e jek.
Since e j−ei is tangent to ` i j, it follows that V4−V3 is concave on `i j and reaches its maximum
on this line at the unique state on ` i j satisfying (v jk)′x = 0. We denote this state by xˇ jk (see
Figure 10).
Let x˜ jk = x∗ + x∗k (e j − ek) ∈ ` i j. We show that V4(x˜ jk) − V3(x˜ jk) > 0. Observe that
d jk(x˜ jk) = x∗k , dζ(x˜ jk) = x∗k , and
d ji(x˜ jk) =
A j−i(x∗ + x∗k (e j − ek))
A j−ij−i
= x∗k
A j−ij−k
A j−ij−i
,
we have that
(58) V4(x˜ jk) − V3(x˜ jk) = 1
2
(x∗k )2A j−ki−k −
12
x∗k A
j−i
j−k
A j−ij−i

2
A j−ij−i +
1
2
(x∗k )2Aζζ
 .
Since
(59) A j−iζi j =
1
x∗k
A j−i(xi j − x∗) = 1
x∗k
A j−ixi j = 0,
and ζi j + ζi ji (e j − ei) = e j − ek, and using expression (28) for ζi j, we have
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Aζζ = (ζ
i j)′Aζi j
= (e j − ek)′Aζi j
= A j−k
A
j−i
j−k
A j−ij−i
(ei − ek) +
Ai− ji−k
A j−ij−i
(e j − ek)

=
1
A j−ij−i
(
A j−ki−k A
j−i
j−k + A
j−k
j−kA
i− j
i−k
)
.
Thus continuing from (58), we have
2A j−ij−i
(x∗k )2
(
V4(x˜ jk) − V3(x˜ jk)
)
= A j−kj−kA
j−i
j−k − (A j−ij−k)2 − A j−ki−k A j−ij−k − A j−kj−kAi− ji−k
= A j−kj−kA
j−i
j−k − (A j−ij−k)2 − A j−ki−k A j−ij−k
= A j−ij−k
(
A j−kj−i − A j−ij−k
)
= A j−ij−kQ
> 0.
as claimed.
Since (v jk)′xˇ jk = 0 and (vik)′(ei − e j) > 0 (see (38)), it follows that xˇ jk = x˜ jk + c(e j − ei) for
some c > 0. Thus as one proceeds along `i j in direction e j− ei starting from x˜ jk, the function
V4 − V3 starts at a positive value, increases until reaching its maximum at xˇ jk, and then
decreases, ultimately approaching−∞. Thus there is a unique point y jk = xˇ jk +b(e j−ei) ∈ `i j
with b > 0 at which V4(x) − V3(x) = 0 (see Figure 10).
If y jki ≥ 0, so that y jk is in X, then we let xˆ jk = y jk, and this point clearly satisfies (50),
(49), and (51). If instead y jki < 0, we let
xˆ jk =
x∗i
x∗i − y jki
y jki +
−y jki
x∗i − y jki
x∗,
which is the point on the segment between y jk and x∗whose ith component is 0 (see Figure
10). Since equality (51) and inequality (50) hold at y jk and are preserved along rays from
x∗, they continue to hold at xˆ jk, with a strict inequality in the case of (50). And since xˆ jkk
is a strictly convex combination of x∗k and −y jkk > 0, we have xˆ jkk < x∗k , which is inequality
(49). This completes the proof of the lemma.
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A.3.3 Continuity and piecewise smoothness of V∗
Lemma A.5 shows that the value function V∗ is continuous on the boundary between
the third and fourth cases of definition (52).
Lemma A.5. If x ∈ B j and (w jk)′x = 0, then V3(x) = V4(x).
Proof. Since (w jk)′x = 0 and w jk = x∗ × (xˆ jk − x∗), we can write x = x∗ + r(xˆ jk − x∗) for
some r ∈ [0, 1]. By condition (51) and the expressions for V3 and V4 above, it is enough
to show that d jk(x) = rd jk(xˆ jk), d ji(x) = rd ji(xˆ jk), and dζ(χ ji(x)) = rdζ(χ ji(x)). And indeed, the
fact that Ax∗ is a multiple of 1 implies that
d jk(x) =
A j−kx
A j−kj−k
= r
A j−kxˆ jk
A j−kj−k
= rd jk(xˆ jk) and
d ji(x) =
A j−ix
A j−ij−i
= r
A j−ixˆ jk
A j−ij−i
= rd ji(xˆ jk),
while the third equality follows from the fact that
dζ(χ ji(x)) = x∗k − e′k(x + (ei − e j)d ji(x)) = x∗k − xk. 
Lemmas A.6 and A.7 establish differentiability of V∗ on the boundaries between the
first and second and the second and third cases of definition (52).
LemmaA.6. If x˜ ∈ B i satisfies x˜ = x∗+d (ei−ek) for some d ≥ 0, then DV1(x˜) = DV2(x˜) = d Ai−k.
Proof. Note first that
DV1(x˜) =
Ai−kx˜
Ai−ki−k
Ai−k =
Ai−k(x∗ + d(ei − ek))
Ai−ki−k
Ai−k = dAi−k.
To compute DV2(x˜), use the definition of χik and Lemma A.4 (or draw a picture) to show
that δik(x˜) = d, χik(x˜) = x∗, and dζ(x∗) = 0. Then since Ai−kx∗ = 0, we have that
DV2(x˜) = δik(x˜)Ai−kDχik(x˜) + Ai−ki−kδ
ik(x˜)Dδik(x˜)
= d Ai−k
I + (ek − ei)Ai− jAi− ji−k
 + Ai−ki−k d Ai− jAi− ji−k
= d Ai−k + d Ai−kk−i
Ai− j
Ai− ji−k
+ Ai−ki−k d
Ai− j
Ai− ji−k
= d Ai−k. 
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Lemma A.7. If y ∈ B i j, then DV2(y) = DV3(y) = (Ay)′ (as linear forms on TX).
Proof. Since y ∈ B i j, δik(y) = 0, χik(y) = y, and dζ(y) = d. Thus
DV2(y) = Ai−kχik(y)Dδik(y) + Aζζd
ζ(χik(y))Ddζ(χik(y))Dχik(y)
= Ai−ky
Ai− j
Ai− ji−k
+ Aζζ(x
∗
k − yk)
−e′k
I + (ek − ei)Ai− jAi− ji−k


= Ai−ky
Ai− j
Ai− ji−k
+ Aζζ(x
∗
k − yk)
−e′k − Ai− jAi− ji−k

=
Ai−ky − Aζζ(x∗k − yk)
Ai− ji−k
Ai− j − Aζζ(x∗k − yk)e′k.
Thus
DV2(y)(ei − ek) = Ai−ky − Aζζ(x∗k − yk) + Aζζ(x∗k − yk) = Ai−ky = (Ay)′(ei − ek),
and since Ai− jζi j = 0 (see (59)) and
(ζi j)′Ay = (ζi j)′A(x∗ + dζ(y)ζi j) = Aζζ(x∗k − yk),
we have
DV2(y)ζi j = Aζζ(x
∗
k − yk) = (Ay)′ζi j.
Since ei − ek and ζi j span TX, we conclude that DV2(y) = (Ay)′.
Again using δ ji(y) = 0 and χ ji(y) = y, we have
DV3(y) = Aζζd
ζ(χ ji(y))Ddζ(χ ji(y))Dχ ji(y)
= Aζζ(x
∗
k − yk)
−e′i
I + (ei − e j)A j−iA j−ij−i


= −Aζζ(x∗k − yk)e′k.
Thus
DV3(y)(ei − e j) = 0 = (Ay)′(ei − e j), and
DV3(y)ζi j = Aζζ(x
∗
k − yk) = (Ay)′ζi j.
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Thus since ei − e j and ζi j span TX, we conclude that DV3(y) = (Ay)′. 
A.3.4 Checking the HJB equation
To complete the proof of Proposition 6.5, we need to show that the HJB equation (19)
is satisfied at all states at which V∗ is C1. In the first case of the definition (52) of V∗, this
follows from Lemma 4.1 and the fact that Q > 0, since equation (36) implies that (vki)′x ≥ 0
when x ∈ B i and x j ≤ x∗j (see Figure 3(ii)).
Similarly, in the the fourth case of definition (52), the HJB equation follows from Lemma
4.1 (with the roles of i and j reversed) and Lemma 6.4, which ensures that (v jk)′x ≥ 0 when
x ∈ B j and (w jk)′x ≥ 0 (see Figure 10).
To handle the two remaining cases of definition (52), we apply Lemma 3.2. Observe
that the regions defined by these cases are convex cones in aff(X) emanating from x∗. Also,
the expressions for DV2(x) and DV3(x) in Appendix A.3.1 imply that within each of these
regions, the function to be minimized in the HJB equation (19) is linear in the displacement
z = x − x∗ of x from x∗. Therefore, to establish inequalities (20) and (21) from Lemma 3.2
for all the states in one of these cones, it is enough to do so at three states: x∗, and one state
from each edge of the cone. Since we have shown that V∗ is C1 on the boundaries between
the first and second and the second and third cases of (52), this analysis also establishes
that the HJB equation (19) holds on these boundaries.
For the second case of definition (52), we show that inequalities (20) and (21) hold at
states x∗, xi j, and x˜ik = x∗ + x∗k (ei − ek) = (x∗i + x∗k )ei + x∗j e j:
DV2(x∗) = DV2(x∗) − (Ax∗)′ = 0′ (as a linear form on TX);
DV2(xi j)(ei − ek) = Ai−kxi j > 0,
DV2(xi j)(ei − e j) = Ai− jxi j = 0,
DV2(xi j) − (Axi j)′ = 0′ (as a linear form on TX);
DV2(x˜ik)(ei − ek) = x∗k Ai−ki−k > 0,
DV2(x˜ik)(ei − e j) = x∗k Ai−ki− j > 0,(
DV2(x˜ik) − (Ax˜ik)′
)
(ek − e j) =
(
DV1(x˜ik) − (Ax˜ik)′
)
(ek − e j) ≤ 0.
The final statement uses the fact that V∗ is C1 on the boundary between the second and
third cases of (52), the fact that (vki)′x˜ik > 0,and the display before Lemma 4.1.
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For the third case of definition (52), we show that inequalities (20) and (21) hold at
states x∗, xi j, and y jk ∈ `i j, the last of which was introduced in the proof of Lemma 6.4
(Appendix A.3.2). The inequalities for the first two states are straightforward to check:
DV3(x∗) = DV3(x∗) − (Ax∗)′ = 0′ (as a linear form on TX),
DV3(xi j)(e j − ek) = A j−kxi j > 0;
DV3(xi j)(e j − ei) = A j−ixi j = 0;
DV3(xi j) − (Axi j)′ = 0′ (as a linear form on TX).
It remains to check inequalities (20) and (21) for state y jk. Since Dχi j(x)(e j − ei) = 0,
DV3(y jk)(e j − ei) = A j−ij−id ji(y jk) > 0.
Next, since
dζ(χ ji(x)) = dζ(x + (ei − e j)d ji(x)) = x∗k − xk,
and since for y ∈ B i j,
Dχ ji(y)(e j − ek) = (e j − ek) + (ei − e j)
A j−ij−k
A j−ij−i
=
1
A j−ij−i
(
(e j − ek)A j−ij−i + (ei − e j)A j−ij−k
)
=
1
A j−ij−i
(
A j−ij−kei + A
i− j
i−ke j − A j−ij−iek
)
= ζi j,
we have
DV3(x)(e j − ek) = A j−ij−kd ji(x) + Aζζdζ(χ ji(x))Ddζ(χ ji(x))Dχ ji(x)(e j − ek)
= A j−ij−kd
ji(x) + Aζζ(x
∗
k − xk)(−e′kζi j)
= A j−ij−kd
ji(x) + Aζζ(x
∗
k − xk).
Thus the fact that y jkk = 0 implies that
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DV3(y jk)(e j − ek) = A j−ij−kd ji(x) + Aζζx∗k > 0.
This establishes the two cases of inequality (20) at state y jk.
It remains to establish inequality (21) at state y jk. Computing as above shows that for
y ∈ B i j,
Dχ ji(y)(ei − ek) = 1
A j−ij−i
(
(ei − ek)A j−ij−i + (ei − e j)A j−ii−k
)
= ζi j, and
DV3(x)(ei − ek) = A j−ii−kd ji(x) + Aζζ(x∗k − xk).
Hence
(DV3(x) − (Ax)′)(ei − ek) = A j−ii−k
A j−ix
A j−ij−i
+ Aζζ(x
∗
k − xk) − Ai−kx
=
1
A j−ij−i
(
A j−ii−kA
j−i − A j−ij−iAi−k
)
x + (ζi j)′Aζi j(x∗k − xk)
=
1
A j−ij−i
(
−A j−ij−kAi − Ai− ji−kA j + A j−ij−iAk
)
x +
1
A j−ij−i
(vi j)′ζi j(x∗k − xk)
= (vi j)′
(
(x∗k − xk)ζi j − x
)
= (vi j)′
(
x∗k − xk
x∗k
(xi j − x∗) − x
)
= (vi j)′
(
x∗k − xk
x∗k
xi j − x
)
.
The proof of Lemma 6.4 shows that y jk = xi j + a(e j − ei) for some a > 0. Thus since y jkk = 0,
we find that
(DV3(y jk) − (Ay jk)′)(ek − ei) = (vi j)′(y jk − xi j) = a(vi j)′(e j − ei) = aQ > 0
where the final equality follows from equation (36). This concludes the verification of the
HJB equation at states where V∗ is smooth, and so completes the proof of Proposition 6.5.
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